1Thrasymachus made all these admissions, not fluently, as I repeat them, but with extreme reluctance; it was a hot summer’s day, and the perspiration poured from him in torrents; and then I saw what I had never seen before, Thrasymachus blushing. As we were now agreed that justice was virtue and wisdom, and injustice vice and ignorance, I proceeded to another point:

2Well, I said, Thrasymachus, that matter is now settled; but were we not also saying that injustice had strength; do you remember?

3Yes, I remember, he said, but do not suppose that I approve of what you are saying or have no answer; if however I were to answer, you would be quite certain to accuse me of haranguing; therefore either permit me to have my say out, or if you would rather ask, do so, and I will answer ‘Very good,’ as they say to story-telling old women, and will nod ‘Yes’ and ‘No.’

4Certainly not, I said, if contrary to your real opinion.

5Yes, he said, I will, to please you, since you will not let me speak. What else would you have?

6Nothing in the world, I said; and if you are so disposed I will ask and you shall answer.

7Proceed.

8Then I will repeat the question which I asked before, in order that our examination of the relative nature of justice and injustice may be carried on regularly. A statement was made that injustice is stronger and more powerful than justice, but now justice, having been identified with wisdom and virtue, is easily shown to be stronger than injustice, if injustice is ignorance; this can no longer be questioned by any one. But I want to view the matter, Thrasymachus, in a different way: You would not deny that a state may be unjust and may be unjustly attempting to enslave other states, or may have already enslaved them, and may be holding many of them in subjection?

9True, he replied; and I will add that the best and most perfectly unjust state will be most likely to do so.

10I know, I said, that such was your position; but what I would further consider is, whether this power which is possessed by the superior state can exist or be exercised without justice or only with justice.

11If you are right in your view, and justice is wisdom, then only with justice; but if I am right, then without justice.

12I am delighted, Thrasymachus, to see you not only nodding assent and dissent, but making answers which are quite excellent.

13That is out of civility to you, he replied.

14You are very kind, I said; and would you have the goodness also to inform me, whether you think that a state, or an army, or a band of robbers and thieves, or any other gang of evil-doers could act at all if they injured one another?

15No indeed, he said, they could not.

16But if they abstained from injuring one another, then they might act together better?

17Yes.

18And this is because injustice creates divisions and hatreds and fighting, and justice imparts harmony and friendship; is not that true, Thrasymachus?

19I agree, he said, because I do not wish to quarrel with you.

20How good of you, I said; but I should like to know also whether injustice, having this tendency to arouse hatred, wherever existing, among slaves or among freemen, will not make them hate one another and set them at variance and render them incapable of common action?

21Certainly.

22And even if injustice be found in two only, will they not quarrel and fight, and become enemies to one another and to the just?

23They will.

24And suppose injustice abiding in a single person, would your wisdom say that she loses or that she retains her natural power?

25Let us assume that she retains her power.