1And can she or can she not fulfil her own ends when deprived of that excellence?

2She cannot.

3Then an evil soul must necessarily be an evil ruler and superintendent, and the good soul a good ruler?

4Yes, necessarily.

5And we have admitted that justice is the excellence of the soul, and injustice the defect of the soul?

6That has been admitted.

7Then the just soul and the just man will live well, and the unjust man will live ill?

8That is what your argument proves.

9And he who lives well is blessed and happy, and he who lives ill the reverse of happy?

10Certainly.

11Then the just is happy, and the unjust miserable?

12So be it.

13But happiness and not misery is profitable.

14Of course.

15Then, my blessed Thrasymachus, injustice can never be more profitable than justice.

16Let this, Socrates, he said, be your entertainment at the Bendidea.

17For which I am indebted to you, I said, now that you have grown gentle towards me and have left off scolding. Nevertheless, I have not been well entertained; but that was my own fault and not yours. As an epicure snatches a taste of every dish which is successively brought to table, he not having allowed himself time to enjoy the one before, so have I gone from one subject to another without having discovered what I sought at first, the nature of justice. I left that enquiry and turned away to consider whether justice is virtue and wisdom or evil and folly; and when there arose a further question about the comparative advantages of justice and injustice, I could not refrain from passing on to that. And the result of the whole discussion has been that I know nothing at all. For I know not what justice is, and therefore I am not likely to know whether it is or is not a virtue, nor can I say whether the just man is happy or unhappy.