1Listen, then, he said; I proclaim that justice is nothing else than the interest of the stronger. And now why do you not praise me? But of course you won’t.

2Let me first understand you, I replied. Justice, as you say, is the interest of the stronger. What, Thrasymachus, is the meaning of this? You cannot mean to say that because Polydamas, the pancratiast, is stronger than we are, and finds the eating of beef conducive to his bodily strength, that to eat beef is therefore equally for our good who are weaker than he is, and right and just for us?

3That’s abominable of you, Socrates; you take the words in the sense which is most damaging to the argument.

4Not at all, my good sir, I said; I am trying to understand them; and I wish that you would be a little clearer.

5Well, he said, have you never heard that forms of government differ; there are tyrannies, and there are democracies, and there are aristocracies?

6Yes, I know.

7And the government is the ruling power in each state?

8Certainly.

9And the different forms of government make laws democratical, aristocratical, tyrannical, with a view to their several interests; and these laws, which are made by them for their own interests, are the justice which they deliver to their subjects, and him who transgresses them they punish as a breaker of the law, and unjust. And that is what I mean when I say that in all states there is the same principle of justice, which is the interest of the government; and as the government must be supposed to have power, the only reasonable conclusion is, that everywhere there is one principle of justice, which is the interest of the stronger.

10Now I understand you, I said; and whether you are right or not I will try to discover. But let me remark, that in defining justice you have yourself used the word ‘interest’ which you forbade me to use. It is true, however, that in your definition the words ‘of the stronger’ are added.

11A small addition, you must allow, he said.

12Great or small, never mind about that: we must first enquire whether what you are saying is the truth. Now we are both agreed that justice is interest of some sort, but you go on to say ‘of the stronger’; about this addition I am not so sure, and must therefore consider further.

13Proceed.

14I will; and first tell me, Do you admit that it is just for subjects to obey their rulers?

15I do.

16But are the rulers of states absolutely infallible, or are they sometimes liable to err?

17To be sure, he replied, they are liable to err.

18Then in making their laws they may sometimes make them rightly, and sometimes not?

19True.

20When they make them rightly, they make them agreeably to their interest; when they are mistaken, contrary to their interest; you admit that?

21Yes.

22And the laws which they make must be obeyed by their subjects,—and that is what you call justice?

23Doubtless.

24Then justice, according to your argument, is not only obedience to the interest of the stronger but the reverse?

25What is that you are saying? he asked.