1Clearly.

2But the good are just and would not do an injustice?

3True.

4Then according to your argument it is just to injure those who do no wrong?

5Nay, Socrates; the doctrine is immoral.

6Then I suppose that we ought to do good to the just and harm to the unjust?

7I like that better.

8But see the consequence:—Many a man who is ignorant of human nature has friends who are bad friends, and in that case he ought to do harm to them; and he has good enemies whom he ought to benefit; but, if so, we shall be saying the very opposite of that which we affirmed to be the meaning of Simonides.

9Very true, he said: and I think that we had better correct an error into which we seem to have fallen in the use of the words ‘friend’ and ‘enemy.’

10What was the error, Polemarchus? I asked.

11We assumed that he is a friend who seems to be or who is thought good.

12And how is the error to be corrected?

13We should rather say that he is a friend who is, as well as seems, good; and that he who seems only, and is not good, only seems to be and is not a friend; and of an enemy the same may be said.

14You would argue that the good are our friends and the bad our enemies?

15Yes.

16And instead of saying simply as we did at first, that it is just to do good to our friends and harm to our enemies, we should further say: It is just to do good to our friends when they are good and harm to our enemies when they are evil?

17Yes, that appears to me to be the truth.

18But ought the just to injure any one at all?

19Undoubtedly he ought to injure those who are both wicked and his enemies.

20When horses are injured, are they improved or deteriorated?

21The latter.

22Deteriorated, that is to say, in the good qualities of horses, not of dogs?

23Yes, of horses.

24And dogs are deteriorated in the good qualities of dogs, and not of horses?

25Of course.