1And will not men who are injured be deteriorated in that which is the proper virtue of man?

2Certainly.

3And that human virtue is justice?

4To be sure.

5Then men who are injured are of necessity made unjust?

6That is the result.

7But can the musician by his art make men unmusical?

8Certainly not.

9Or the horseman by his art make them bad horsemen?

10Impossible.

11And can the just by justice make men unjust, or speaking generally, can the good by virtue make them bad?

12Assuredly not.

13Any more than heat can produce cold?

14It cannot.

15Or drought moisture?

16Clearly not.

17Nor can the good harm any one?

18Impossible.

19And the just is the good?

20Certainly.

21Then to injure a friend or any one else is not the act of a just man, but of the opposite, who is the unjust?

22I think that what you say is quite true, Socrates.

23Then if a man says that justice consists in the repayment of debts, and that good is the debt which a just man owes to his friends, and evil the debt which he owes to his enemies,—to say this is not wise; for it is not true, if, as has been clearly shown, the injuring of another can be in no case just.

24I agree with you, said Polemarchus.

25Then you and I are prepared to take up arms against any one who attributes such a saying to Simonides or Bias or Pittacus, or any other wise man or seer?